This paper investigates how early termination of venture capital (VC) investment in entrepreneurial ventures affect the ability of these young ventures into acquiring further resources necessary for survival and growth. We propose that young entrepreneurial ventures face a higher cost of external financing if existing investors stop investing in the next rounds of financing. Future investors, faced with great unobservable qualities of young companies and the uncertainty surrounding their financial prospect, rely on observable characteristics to appraise a company; The continuation of investment by existing investors confers a positive signal about the quality of young ventures and that young ventures, as endorsed by further commitment of capital, are more likely to perform better than otherwise comparable ventures that lack such escalated commitment.
INTRODUCTION
Entrepreneurs seek VC support not only for financial support; but also they look forward to value added services provided by VCs such as professionalizing management team (Hellmann & Puri, 2002) . In addition to these first-hand contributions of VCs to success of entrepreneurial ventures, the backing of VCs is a quality signal to the market (Carter & Manaster 1990; Stuart et al. 1999) . VCs are very selective and only finance potentially high growth firms; and in return, VCbacked ventures experience better performance, e.g. they are more likely to go public or get acquired (Gulati & Higgins. 2003) .
Further investigation is warranted to study how the involvement of VC, beyond its selective capabilities, sends a quality signal. For instance, reputed VCs produce a better outcome (Hochberg et al., 2007) ; though reputed VCs require a 10-14 percent valuation discount to start equity investment (Hsu, 2004) . This paper explores a new dimension of VC affiliation on entrepreneurial ventures' outcome. Specifically, this paper investigates how early termination of investment in a venture by an existing VC investor negatively influences the prospects of entrepreneurial venture even if the entrepreneurial venture is of a quality grade investable by other investors.
The case of early termination of investment in a venture by an existing VC is illustrated by the pattern of investments in Instagram, a social photo-sharing mobile application venture.
Andreessen Horowitz, a Silicon Valley venture capital firm, terminated its participation in the follow-up rounds (e.g. series A, B) after a seed round of USD 250 thousand in Instagram. Facebook Inc. acquired Instagram for approximately USD 1 billion two years later than its seed funding round. Indeed, a cursory observation of typical VC investment suggests that VCs typically re-invest in subsequent stages of financing unless the venture is perceived to be a case of failure. Specific to Instagram case, Marc Andreessen, the co-founder of Andreessen Horowitz points out "we (or any venture firm) make(s) an A-round investment, we typically reserve another 2-3x of the A-round investment size for participation in future follow-on rounds for that company. So a $5M Series A shows up on our books more like a $20M commitment. The other $15M isn't necessarily always deployed, of course, but we also double down even more strongly in certain cases (either out of opportunity or sometimes necessity) so it balances out."
1 Marc Andreessen goes on to point to a conflict developed in the portfolio of their investments after the seed round of Instagram, i.e.
Instagram evolved its product and "ended up doing similar things" 2 to another portfolio venture.
"This kind of conflict-which happens frequently in the venture capital business as companies 1 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6530536 2 http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/20/how-andreessen-horowitz-fumbled-an-instagram-investment/ evolve" 3 , or any other conflict -which results in an investor leaving (money on) the table is the study subject of this paper, a phenomenon we call "VC early termination of investment in a venture".
In this paper, we aim to draw from signaling theory to shed light into how the discontinuation of investment in an entrepreneurial venture by an existing investor conveys a negative signal, resulting in a "side-effect". We argue the side effect is a consequence of the presence of information asymmetry in entrepreneurial financing. Information asymmetry is a prevalent feature of entrepreneurial financing since entrepreneurial ventures have a short track record of performance and lack legitimacy. We find that the decision of potential investors is adversely affected if an investor gives up funding the subsequent rounds of financing, furthering adverse selection problems.
We construct a sample of 5,016 round of VC investment (venture-VC) in 1,728 entrepreneurial ventures that received more than one round of investment. We apply the Heckman two-stage framework to control for the endogeneity of VC early termination and examine the impact of VC early termination on the financial terms and quality of potential investors in the next round of financing. We find that early termination is associated with lower valuation in subsequent round of financing and also reduce the attractiveness of the venture by attracting lower quality potential VCs in its follow-on round of investment.
Our goal is two-fold in this paper; first, we reveal the manifest of negative signal in the subsequent valuation of the venture, which has experienced early termination of investment. We report results in entrepreneurial finance, consistent with Akerlof's prediction (1970) . Akerlof (1970) uses the markets for used cars to demonstrate a discount in price is followed by exacerbated levels of information asymmetry. Second, we seek to examine the view held by economists that 3 http://bhorowitz.com/2012/04/22/instagram/ accreditation of party that originates the signal may moderate the (negative) perception of the signal, ceteris paribus. We find that the prominence of VC leaving the venture and stage specialization of VC are moderating the negative signal of early termination on venture's valuation to different degrees.
This paper contributes to the entrepreneurial finance literature for at least two reasons; First, Our work is a departure from establishing link between the presence of VC and a dichotomous quality signal (Stuart, Hoang & Hybels, 1999) . Since, VC invests in multiple stages and often in syndication, a closer look at how VCs stage financing entrepreneurial ventures in syndication and their decisions in this context progresses our understanding about the signaling value of VC affiliation. Along this inquiry, we intend to show that literature of signaling in entrepreneurial finance is better informed if researchers focus their attention on the interaction of VC syndicate members. This approach, as we argue, yields interesting conclusions with respect to the entrepreneurial venture's outcome, a consequence of particular interest to researchers and practitioners.
Second, we pay attention to the attributes of the involved VC and how these attributes and actions influence the future development of the venture; VCs are heterogeneous in their affiliation, e.g. independent VC vs. Corporate VC, and quality, i.e. experience to take companies public. This heterogeneity is linked to a number of consequent value-adding outputs; for instance, corporate VCs are inclined to pursue strategic objectives rather than pure financial objectives and they can provide corporate resources (Dushnitsky & Shaver 2005) . We highlight how the attributes of involved VCs influences the prospects of the ventures in a new context; a context in which the bargaining power of entrepreneur, and existing investors not leaving the venture, is compromised in obtaining further financial resources from potential investors. Indeed, this context in literature has been neglected so far in our opinion and from this starting point; we hope to encourage researchers to study other aspects of this context. The paper is organized as following. First, we discuss the background of this paper by addressing first, the foundations of signaling framework in entrepreneurial finance and second, we turn to motivate why an existing investor would want to discontinue investment. Following the background, we develop the theory and relevant hypothesis. Next, we provide the methods including data, variables and the results. We conclude by discussing our findings and the limitations of this research.
BACKGROUND
Research using signaling theory in the context of entrepreneurial venture has shown the promise and its relevance in a number of contexts such as IPO (Gulati & Higgins, 2003) and acquisition market (Reuer, Tong, & Wu, 2012) . We proceed by first introducing the signaling framework and second, we paint a picture about early termination of VC investment and when it is more likely to occur.
Information Asymmetry and Signaling
The short track record of entrepreneurial ventures by which the quality is assessable, possess a challenge for the evaluation to investors (Amit et al., 1998 costly for high-quality ventures to generate than low quality ones (Spence, 1970) . Granted these conditions, a quality signal plays a central role in reducing information asymmetry, assisting investors to mitigate adverse selection problem. It is no surprise that entrepreneurial ventures possessing more quality signals are desirable to investors, and are more likely to receive higher valuations (for instance see Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013; Heeley et al., 2007) .
Entrepreneurial organizations can convey their quality through a number of mechanisms, which assist evaluators estimate the conditional probability of success given those observable set of characteristics. For example, the ability to patent by a young venture is not only a mechanism to appropriate the rents of invention (the intrinsic value of patent); but also a signal proving the deep technological capabilities of the venture that are outcomes of high quality staff. Hence, patents in high tech ventures are resources performing a dual role (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2013) , protecting intellectual property and promoting visibility to potential investors by providing a quality signal.
There are three qualitatively distinct categories of information that influence the perception of quality judgment of young ventures. First, founders' human capital (Dimov & Shepherd, 2005; Cooper et al., 1994 ) is initially considered a valuable asset and determinant of venture success.
Evidence suggests that VCs overestimate the role of start-ups' human capital for the future success (Baum & Silverman, 2004) by attaching considerable selection attention (see Colombo & Grilli, 2010) . The second category of relevant information to future investors is related to the previous accomplishment of the firms (Hallen, 2008) , be it patents (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2013) or product prototype (Audretsch et al., 2012) . For instance, prototype signals the feasibility of the technology and in combination with patents attracts potential investors (Audretsch et al., 2012) . Third category of information that evaluators can use to assess the quality of the nascent venture is the attributes of inter-organizational ties (Stuart et al., 1999) . Affiliation with prominent strategic alliance partners, well-connected VCs and reputable bank underwriters (Gulati & Higgins, 2003) are positively associated with the quality of the entrepreneurial firm.
VC early termination of investment in a venture
When a VC decides to adopt a wait-and-see approach by giving up follow-on investments, it indicates a serious revision of its prior expectations from the venture. Even if other VC firms fund the venture, the shares of the focal VC may severely dilute. As an interviewee in (Guler, 2007) Principal-agent problems: The conflict of interest between entrepreneur and VC may create conflicts of interest. For instance, Entrepreneurs may prefer exit via IPO over acquisition since they enjoy private benefits from being the CEO of a publicly listed company (i.e. investor with strong control rights would affect acquisition over IPO in case of similar financial return when entrepreneurs would prefer an IPO for private benefits) (Cumming, 2008) . (5) Learning of the lowperforming quality of venture: VC investor may come to the conclusion that venture is low quality after it learns more about the venture (e.g. that the venture is failing). Learning is a consequence of VC staging. If VCs learn negative information about the prospects of the venture, the project is less likely to be financed (Gompers, 1995) . So, Early termination of investment in a financing round should reflect the probability of success, conditional on the learning and belief update of VC.
Notwithstanding this plausible rationality behind early termination, there is evidence of systematic failure to terminate early investment in ventures, a phenomenon called "escalation of commitment" (Birmingham et al., 2003) .
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS

VC Early termination of investment as a negative signal
Academic work in corporate finance has been informative with respect to the relevance of negative signaling to potential investors in the presence of information asymmetry. For instance, a stream of literature on the choice of a firm's finance structure, e.g. debt or equity offering, uncovers why equity offerings are viewed as negative signals, reducing firm's share price (For theoretical discussion, see Leland and Pyle (1977) , Ross (1977) , Stiglitz (1982) , and Meyers and Majluf (1984) and for a discussion of empirical evidence, see Asquith and Mullins (1983) ). Owners leverage his inside information to issue equity when their shares are overvalued -owners are assumed to know more about firm's prospects than potential lenders or equity purchasers, in turn market reacts negatively to the announcement of equity offerings. On the contrary, when owners/managers believe a bad outcome is less likely, they signal that knowledge by undertaking debt.
A parallel observation can be drawn in the context of early termination of VC investment in a venture. Existing VCs possess private information manifested in their information rights; VCs often demand board rights to monitor their investments (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2003) . As such, existing investor has privileged information vis a vis outsiders and his actions convey information about the venture's prospects to potential investors. Anecdotal evidence also reveals this point. "We spend all the time as a firm managing signaling risk and we had talked to lots of entrepreneurs or other seed investors about whether or not our participation in the next rounds would actually undermine our relationships with entrepreneurs." The signaling risk is not limited to entrepreneurs; it affects potential investors as well. VC investors are keen on the assessments of their peers. Since VCs solicit "second opinion" on the quality of deals when they decide to invest (Manigart et al., 2006; Brander et al., 2002) , they are systematically trained to factor into their decisions the views of their peers when it comes to syndication of investments (especially given that existing VCs know more by definition). Wouldbe-investors give informational weight to their peer review. If an existing investor leaves the syndication, they are induced to discount the value of the new venture. Therefore, early termination is a "strong" and "visible" type of signal to potential investors. There is further evidence in finance There is a fairly robust finding pointing to a positive sorting between entrepreneurial ventures and VCs; Better quality ventures match with reputable VCs (Sorensen, 2007) . On one side, entrepreneurs are willing to pay a valuation premium to be affiliated with high quality VCs (Hsu, 2004 ) and on the other side of table, VCs try to establish reputation, which is an important factor in successful fund raising for new funds (Gompers, 1996) . With that said, we expect that the negative signal from early termination to affect adversely the perceived quality, hence attracting less reputable VCs.
Hypothesis 1b. VC Early termination of investment in a venture has a negative effect on the overall reputation of the future investors in the subsequent round of financing for the focal venture.
The moderating role of attributes of VC
Although, we control for the quality of the venture and use an empirical method that appropriately addresses endogeneity, the directions of both ex post negative signal and ex ante deteriorating performance is going in the same direction towards a valuation discount. In order to isolate the effect of negative signaling from deteriorating performance, we identify conditions under which early VC termination are likely to act as strong or weak quality signals (differential impact),
holding constant venture quality type. Our strategy is to vary the characteristics of VCs who terminate the investment, e.g. reputation and specialization. First, we argue that the quality of ventures on average is high when they are associated with industry and (early) stage specialized VCs or reputable VCs. Second, we show an economically significant difference of the impact of early termination of these types of VCs on the valuation.
Some VCs are specialized in specific stages of the development, geographical areas or industries (Knill, 2009 H2. Early termination of investment by a stage specialist VC has weaker negative effect on the valuation of the entrepreneurial venture.
Well-connected VCs (i.e. VC that enjoy central positions in the syndicate network) are able to provide better value-added services and hence, enhance a new venture performance (Hochberg et al., 2007) . On average, we expect that the performance of entrepreneurial firms associated with prominent VC to infer high quality.
As would-be investors strive to assess the quality of the venture, they scrutinize the relationship of the venture with other organizations (Stuart et al., 1999) , with special considerations to their reputation. VCs are prominent inter-organizational ties with equity stake. The loss of a prominent affiliation is status decreasing; this is in fact in the reverse direction of the status transfer from forming strategic partnerships with prominent affiliates (Stuart et al., 1999). 9 H3. Early termination of investment by a prominent VC investor has stronger negative effect on the valuation of the entrepreneurial venture.
9
This negative association is expected to be pronounced for early stage investors since VCs don't mind syndicating with less established firms in later rounds (Lerner, 1994) .
METHODS
Data sources
We use SDC Platinum database to build the sample of VC-backed entrepreneurial ventures. From all VC rounds of financing in the U.S. from 1980 to 2012, we exclude observations which are not considered as "Venture Capital". We exclude all observations for an entrepreneurial venture in which at least one investor is labeled "Undisclosed firm". The reason for this exclusion criterion is that we rely on venture capital firm names provided by SDC Platinum to determine if a venture receives financing from an existing investor in its subsequent round of financing. We focus on investments in only two States of California and Massachusetts for the following reason. In the US, majority of VC investments are prevalent in California and Massachusetts 10 and quality signal is found to be more relevant in regions with high density of entrepreneurial activity (and consequently, VCs) 11 . We limit our study to transitions from first round of investment to second round. Hence, we consider early termination of investment only if the name of an investor present in first round is not mentioned in the second round; This filter is applied since the signal effect of early termination is likely to be stronger in the early round when the presence of information asymmetry is acute (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2003; Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009 ) -e.g. The more the venture matures, the more likely it is to acquire other endorsement signals and certifications such as positive revenues 12 . The SDC database overstated the rounds of financing and considers any separate investment dates as a new round (Gompers & Lerner, 1999; Guler, 2007; Cumming & Dai, 10 In our sample between 1980 till 2012 more than 50% of observations belong to entrepreneurial venture in California and
Massachusetts.
11 Refining classic signaling model of Spence (1973) by introducing changes in the quantity and quality of labor supply, A matching tournament model of a labor market (Hopkins 2012) shows that increased competition leads to more efficient investment in education under flexible wage. if one takes the VC investments as a market with changes in quantity and quality of supply of entrepreneurial ventures, (having in mind the local bias of VC investments (Cumming, Dai 2010), we expect that a market (represented with location) with more competitive conditions leads to more efficient investment decisions. 12 Each additional round is an indicator of progress and a good proxy for performance (Gompers, Lerner 2001 , Mann, Sager 2007 . In our setting since entrepreneurial ventures are able to raise the second round of financing, it indicates a minimum threshold of quality. From this sampling filter, the concern over early termination due to low quality of entrepreneurial venture is alleviated. Hence the entrepreneurial ventures in our sample are more homogenous regarding their quality. 2012). We correct for this problem by considering the investment rounds that happens in time intervals shorter than 90 days as one round (Guler, 2007) . In order to be able to track the exit of entrepreneurial venture, we limit our sample to entrepreneurial venture, which received first round of investment in 2007 or sooner -we allow at least 5 years for exit. After excluding observations with missing data on the amount invested in the second round, applying above filters, we obtain 5,016 round of VC investment in 1,728 entrepreneurial ventures.
Measures Dependent Variable: Performance
Amount of money raised in the second round. In this study, we investigate the impact of early termination of investment in the next round of investment. In order to proxy for performance in the second round of financing, we consider the amount of money that entrepreneurial ventures receive in second round (round size) of investment (H1a) (inflated by millions of 2012 dollar) -Although a more accurate measure is pre-money valuation, we don't have access to this variable.
Higher round size shows better deal terms that entrepreneurial venture has been able to receive (Cumming & Dai, 2012) .
Quality of VC. Entrepreneurial ventures prefer to be associated with higher quality VC even if high quality VCs require a premium of about 10-14 percent on valuation (Hsu, 2004 ). Higher quality VCs add more value and provide stronger certification signal. We use the quality of outside VCs 13 that invest in the second round as a proxy for venture's quality (H1b). The quality of outside VC has been calculated using different proxies.
First, we consider "general experience" (Gompers et al., 2009) , the number of rounds in which a VC participated in the prior past five years to that round investment (Sorensen, 2007) since 13 Outsider is defined as VC which did not participated in the first round and is facing high information asymmetry in evaluating quality of entrepreneurial venture (Sorensen, 2007) . Prior literature shows importance of access to high quality VCs in follow-on rounds. For instance, Cumming and Dai (2012) documented that entrepreneurial ventures with higher perceived quality are more likely to switch to the more reputable VC. While Cumming and Dai (2012) focused on switching of lead investor on deal terms we investigate deeper the dynamic of syndication by looking at early termination by any of investors in the round of investment. Hence, we use centrality, specifically "eigenvector centrality", of VC firm in syndication network as a proxy for its quality; eigenvector centrality measures the degree to which a VC shares ties with well-connected VC (a detailed description of network analysis and its importance in VC industry is provided in Hochberg (2007) . Finally, we used the "size of fund under the management of VC" from which the investment in the round takes place. The size of fund measures the reputation and past performance of VC since more reputable and more successful VCs are able to raise larger funds (Gompers, 1996) .
Independent variables
We define early termination of VC investment in a venture when at least one of the investors in the first round does not participate in the following rounds of investment. If the investor temporally does not participate in the second round but returned in follow on rounds, this is not treated as early termination of VC investment in a venture. About 22 percent of all observations have at least one early termination of investment, suggesting early termination is not uncommon in VC investment.
In order to decide if a VC firm is early-stage specialist, we calculated share of prior investment in "Early Stage" and "Seed" in total investment deals VC has made from its vintage year. We consider a VC as early stage specialist if their relative early stage experience is on top quartile of the sample (27%) 14 , otherwise a stage generalist ("Specialist early termination VS.
Generalist early termination"). In order to identify the prominent VC, VCs are marked prominents if their eigenvector centrality is above mean values of eigenvector centrality in that year ("Prominent early termination VS. Non-prominent early termination") 15 (Gompers et al., 2009 ).
Control Variables
Outside round: Mostly follow-on investment rounds include an outsider -a VC that did not invested in prior rounds, which usually make the largest investment (Lerner, 1994 ). An outside investor can mitigate the possible conflict between the entrepreneur and insider investors over the valuation of venture (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994 et al., 2013) . Hence, the deal that they participate might differ from the deals that do not include foreign investors. We control for a round which there is at least one cross border investor in the second round.
First round Early stage: Early stage investments are riskier (Gompers & Lerner, 1999) since entrepreneurial ventures usually lack a financial performance and require large effort to achieve success. The stage they received first round of investment can show the required coaching and capital in proceeding rounds.
Quality of venture: in order to quantify the quality/performance of entrepreneurial venture, we lack accounting data and therefore, we should resort to ex post measures of quality; Cumming and Dai (2012) propose to calculate the perceived quality of entrepreneurial venture in each round by 14 The mean of whole sample is 23.5% and median is equal to 23.6%. 15 Alternatively we considered general experience of VC. The results are similar.
considering the fitted probability of successful exit. Success is defined as the occurrence of an IPO or M&A by the end of 2012. The success is predicted using entrepreneurial venture stage, location, industry and the natural logarithm of the amount of investment received ($M of 2012) and year of investment.
Age: we control for age of entrepreneurial venture in round of investment.
Syndication size: VC firms usual invest with group of investors -syndicate deals. Prior studies shows syndicated deals have better performance and the size of syndication is related to the diversity and specialization of syndicate investors. Syndication size represents the number of VC firms participated in round of investment (Lerner, 1994) . The control of syndication size is necessary since it conduces political pressure on an investors to escalate their commitment (Birmingham et al., 2003; Guler, 2007) .
California: Ventures based in California have better access to capital relative to any other States.
We control whether firm is located in California or not.
VC type: objectives and investment strategies of VC firms vary depending on their affiliation and governance (e.g. Dimov & Gedajlovic, 2010) . VC type is included in the model through four dummy variables (five groups) indicating whether an investor is a private VC, a corporate VC, a bank affiliated VC, an individual (including angel investors) and "Other" (the baseline variable).
Investment Stage: Entrepreneurial ventures depending on their development stage require different amount of capital and coaching. We include 3 dummy variables for whether in the second round they are in "Seed", "Early stage" and "expansion". "Later stage" is the omitted variable.
Industry: Entrepreneurial ventures may vary in term of required capital, coaching and exit in different industries (Gompers & Lerner, 1999) . We controlled for industry of entrepreneurial venture using industry classification of SDC platinum (Gompers, 1995 "Other" is the omitted category.
We also control for general market condition by including IPO market condition as number of IPOs in the years of investment. We also include number of VC deals in the year of investment as the number of investment opportunities available. It also includes two dummy variables to account for the booming information technology market in the period 1998-2000 and the market crash due to the financial crisis in the period -2009 (Nahata, 2008 . Table 1 provides a list and definition of all variables.
---------------------------[Table 1 about here] ---------------------------
Analysis
In this study we focus on the impact of early termination of investment on the deal term and quality of VC that entrepreneurial venture is able to attract in proceeding round of investment. In all models The main concern in this model is that VC early termination (Early_term j) is endogenous to deal term (DealTerm ij ) and using a simple OLS can lead to biased results. In order to resolve this issue, we use the Heckman treatment two-stage regression. In the first stage, we estimate a probit model to estimate the probability that early termination of investment happens (explained in more detail in the next paragraph). In Equation 1, the deal term (DealTerm ij ) is dependent on VC early termination (Early_term j ), Deal characteristics, Entrepreneurial venture characteristics, VC characteristics and general market conditions. Deal characteristics (DEAL ij ) includes outside investor -a dummy=1 if a new VC joined in second deal, foreign VC -a dummy=1 if at least one investor is foreign, number of VCs in the round, investment stage -3 dummies for whether the second round of investment is in "Seed", "Early stage", "Expansion". In Equation 2, the probability of early termination of investment is instrumented by geographical distance (distance j ) between VC and entrepreneurial venture in the first round, the predicted value of entrepreneurial venture's quality (quality j ), deal characteristics of first round (DEAL ij ), VC characteristics (VC i ), entrepreneurial venture characteristics (PC j ) at first round and general market conditions (Y t ) at the time of first investment.
The choice of instrument, geographical proximity, is first, relevant and second, satisfies the exclusion restriction. The relevancy is motivated by studies that argue geographical proximity between VC and venture reduces information asymmetry and increases the probability of receiving 20 VC financing (Lerner, 1995; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001; Cumming & Dai, 2010) 18 Similar approach was adopted in different investment decisions such as M&A and equity trading (Ragozzino & Reuer 2011; Coval & Moskowitz, 1999) 19 VCs are not homogenous group of investors and may pursue different goals, leading to conflicts of interests (Chahine et al., 2012) .
This measures the extent of differences between investors in the round of investment. Alternatively we use syndication size, the number of investors in the round of investment. The results are robust.
investment year as indicating the supply (investment opportunities). We also includes two dummy variables to account for time variations -the booming information technology market in the period 1998-2000 and the market crash due to the financial crisis in the period -2009 (Nahata, 2008 Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of entrepreneurial ventures that one of their investors in first round of investment terminated its investment in second round. As Table 3 indicates early termination of investment by a venture is more likely to happen to entrepreneurial venture that received second round of investment in "expansion stage", they are mainly in computer software and internet-specific entrepreneurial ventures and they received more money in the first round of investment. Table 4 compares the consequence of early termination of investment. The early termination of investment leads to reduction of round size and also shows reduction in experience of outside investors in the second round measured by general experience, IPO experience, Network centrality and fund size. While the experience is lower in absolute number but it is not statistically significant in all cases. In the next section in a multivariate analysis by considering the endogeneity issue, we further investigate the difference between the two groups. Table 5 shows the pair wise correlation matrix.
---------------------------[Table 2 about here] ----------------------------
-------------------------[Table 3 about here] -------------------------
----------------------------------[Table 4 and 5 about here] ----------------------------------
Early termination of investment and deal term
We employ two-stage Heckman selection model to obtain unbiased estimates of VC early termination of investment. In panel B of table 6, we predict the probability of early termination of investment using the following covariates: maximum distance between VC firms participated in the first round of investment and the entrepreneurial venture, perceived quality of entrepreneurial venture, stage of investment, diversity of VCs participated in the first round, age of the oldest fund participated in the first round, location, industry and general market condition.
--------------------------
[ Table 6 about here]
From panel B in table 6, we estimate inverse mills ratio denoted by "lambda" and use it in Panel A of Table 6 Fried, 2012 ).
---------------------------
[ Table 7 about here] Table 7 shows ventures experiencing early termination of investment is less likely to attract 
Stage Experience and Early Termination Of Investment
In the second hypothesis, we hypothesized if the VC is a stage specialist (e.g. early stage investor), it is possible that the impact of negative signal of early termination of investment is weaker in comparison with early termination of investment by generalists VC (e.g. VC that invests in all stage). In Table 8 , we test this proposition by considering only the exit of generalist VC or specialist VC. The size and significance of negative effect of early termination increases for generalist VCs. By early termination of a generalist VC, the round size reduces around 110.4 % and general experience of outsider reduces significantly. The outsider VC on average has made around 128 less deals in prior 5 years, invested in 8 venture less that went public and has 5.2% less centrality 20 . While this impact for stage specialist is much smaller and insignificant in some cases.
----------------------------------
[ Table 8 about here]
Prominent VC and Early termination of investment
In the hypothesis 3, we hypothesized that early termination of investment by a prominent VC confers a stronger negative signal about the entrepreneurial venture and leads to lower deal terms in following rounds. Table 9 , the negative impact of early termination of investment by a prominent VC is statistically significant and larger in comparison with a non-prominent VCs 21 .
----------------------------------
[ Table 9 about here]
DISCUSSION
We find that negative information is broadcasted to potential investors from insiders (who hold equity stakes). Discontinuation of investment exacerbates information asymmetry, inducing a discount in the price of venture (Akerlof, 1970) . After controlling for venture's quality and the endogeneity of early termination of VC in a venture, the results imply that continued equity commitment of existing investors can act as endorsement that shape the perception of outside investors. As a result of unambiguous or relatively scarce measures of observable quality, quality signals are helpful in mitigating information asymmetry. We suggest that continuation of equity investment relationship is a quality signal, conveying that young companies have been able to earn a positive evaluation (at least from inside investors). In other words, we find that young 20 We repeated the analysis for fund size of outsider investor the result is similar and exit of generalist VC leads to 67.8% reduce in fund size of outsider investor. For brevity we did not report the results and are available upon request. 21 For brevity the treatment analysis is not reported. The results are very similar to the one in previous analysis. financing. However, they neglect principal-principal agencies in VC syndications (Chahine et al., 2012) . Therefore, there is a drawback in abstracting the syndication to the lead member.
Our research is limited in the sense that we cannot distinguish between VCs that sell their equity shares or those that retain their shares when they give up funding follow-on rounds. Further research can benefit from this distinction. Further research can shed light on how different types of conflict (which we discussed earlier) may lead a VC to terminate its investment and how each may impact the development of entrepreneurial venture. Table 1 all models Robust Std. Err. in parentheses * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.0
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